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Abstract
The flagship of the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulatory reinvention initiative, Project XL
has been touted as a ‘regulatory blueprint’ for a site-specific, performance-based pollution control
system.  But widespread complaints about the costs of the program beg the question of whether the
costs of tailoring regulations to individual facilities are manageable.  To address this question, this
paper presents original survey data on a sample of 11 XL projects.  We find that the fixed costs of
putting in place XL agreements are substantial, averaging over $450,000 per firm.  While stakeholder
negotiations are widely cited as the principal source for these costs, we find that they actually arise
mainly from interaction between participating facilities and the EPA.  Moreover, EPA management
problems are perceived by our survey respondents as having inflated project development costs.
Finally, we find that the key factor that explains differences in costs across XL projects is the scope
and complexity of the project proposal.  These findings suggest that Project XL favors large firms that
can afford to pay significant project development costs, that EPA management problems must be
resolved to reduce costs, and that there may be a significant economic bias against complex and
innovative proposals—precisely the type of proposals that Project XL was designed to foster in order
to improve the efficiency of the regulatory system.
Key Words:  Project XL, site-specific regulation, tailored regulation, voluntary regulation,
transactions costs, regulatory reform and reinventioniii
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The Cost of Developing Site-Specific Environmental Regulations:
Evidence from EPA’s Project XL
Allen Blackman and Janice Mazurek1
Launched with considerable fanfare in March 1995, Project XL (which stands for eXcellence and
Leadership) is the flagship of the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulatory reinvention
initiative.  Project XL is premised on the idea that the existing command and control regulatory
system stifles efficiency and innovation by dictating “one size fits all” abatement strategies rather
than letting individual facilities decide how to control pollution.  Facilities that participate in Project
XL are allowed to develop pollution control strategies that “replace or modify specific regulatory
requirements” on the condition that these strategies improve their environmental performance (60 FR
27282).  In essence, Project XL defines site-specific performance standards that are more stringent
than the de facto standards implied by current regulation, and allows facilities some flexibility in
meeting them.
Project XL has frequently been described as a prototype for a new site-specific approach to
environmental regulation.  President Clinton has called it a “regulatory blueprint for the future,” a
characterization that has been reflected to varying degrees in the popular press and in the policy
literature (Phillips, 1995; Cushman, 1996; NAPA, 1997; Hauseker, 1999).  Yet by virtually all
accounts, Project XL has fallen short of early expectations.  After five years, only 15 facilities are
implementing XL agreements.
Whether Project XL eventually emerges as prototype for a new regulatory regime or just an abortive
experiment, it provides an unparalleled opportunity to evaluate the barriers to site-specific
performance-based regulation.  The academic literature analyzing the project has focused almost
exclusively on institutional and legal barriers (e.g., Susskind and others, 1997; Cabellero, 1998).
Partly because there has been little data available, an equally important barrier has received far less
attention in the literature:  the costs to firms, regulators and other stakeholders of tailoring regulations
to individual facilities.  Such costs are sometimes referred to as “project development costs” or
“transactions costs” to emphasize they arise from putting site-specific regulations in place rather than
complying with them after they have been established.  If these costs are significant—as intuition
would suggest—at least two troubling implications for site-specific regulation follow.  First, given the
sheer number of polluters in the United States, implementation on a broad scale would be neither
practical nor efficient.  And second, a site-specific regime would favor firms that, for whatever
reason, find it either less costly or more beneficial to participate.
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Thus, realizing the benefits of site-specific regulation will depend on controlling project development
costs.  Towards this end, this paper presents both original survey data and publicly available data on a
sample of 11 XL projects.  We address three related research questions:
•  What is magnitude of project development costs?
•  What stages of the project development process and what issues associated with that
process are perceived as being the most costly?
•  Why is the project development process more costly for some facilities?  In particular,
what role do characteristics of the project proposal, the facility, the firm, and the
negotiation process play in determining the magnitude of project development costs?
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first in-depth effort to address these issues.  The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The first section provides further background on
Project XL.  The second section develops an informal conceptual framework to underpin the
empirical analysis.  The third section briefly discusses our data and sample.  The fourth section
outlines our methodology.  The fifth section presents our empirical results.  The last section sums up
and concludes.
1.  Background
1.1.  The project development process
This section describes the regulatory process that gives rise to project development costs (US EPA,
1999a).  First, applicants draft project proposals and submit them to EPA.  In theory, they do this in
cooperation with EPA regional offices—the EPA divisions that are primarily responsible for
individual XL projects—as well as with state regulators and other local stakeholders.  Next, a team of
EPA and local regulators reviews the proposal, requests any additional information or revisions
deemed necessary, and makes a recommendation as to whether the project should go forward.
Proposals are judged by eight criteria:
•  Environmental results: the project should “achieve environmental performance that is
superior to what would be achieved through compliance with current and reasonably
anticipated future regulations.”
•  Cost savings and paperwork reduction.
•  Stakeholder support: sponsors are responsible for seeking and enlisting the support of
stakeholders including communities near the project, local and state governments,
businesses, and environmental advocates.
•  Innovation/multi-media pollution prevention.
•  Transferability: projects should test new approaches that could one day be applied more
broadly.
•  Technical and administrative feasibility.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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•  Monitoring reporting and evaluation: sponsors should make information about the project
and project performance available and understandable and define clear measurable
objectives.
•  Avoid shifting the risk burden: the project must protect worker safety and ensure that “no
one is subjected to unjust or disproportionate environmental impacts.”
If proposals meet these criteria, the applicant, regulators, and direct participating stakeholders
negotiate a Final Project Agreement (FPA) that defines the innovation to be tested, the required level
of environmental performance, the regulatory flexibility that will be granted, what conditions must be
met, and how the results will be monitored.  The last step in the project development process is
obtaining final approval from EPA headquarters.
1.2.  Literature and history
Virtually since its inception, Project XL has been plagued by the perception that the project
development process is too costly.  As early as the summer of 1996, a little over a year after the
program was unveiled, participating firms complained that poor coordination among federal, regional,
and local regulators and a lack of clarity in project guidelines—particularly those concerning superior
environmental performance and the stakeholder process—were driving up project development costs
(Environmental Reporter, 1996; Inside EPA, 1996a).
Written analysis of Project XL has consistently mirrored these early industry complaints.  For
example, Steinzor (1996) argues that Project XL was pushed forward without clear guidelines for
political reasons.  Yosie and Herbst (1996) present survey data reflecting frustration among XL
participants over the length and cost of EPA’s review process and conflicts between EPA regional
offices and headquarters.  The General Accounting Office (US GAO, 1997) contends that Project XL
is hampered by poor coordination with other reinvention initiatives, consensus-based stakeholder
decision-making, weak evaluation, and a failure to secure buy-in by Agency staff.  Finally, Mank
(1998) argues that Project XL has been stymied by flaws in program design and by legal uncertainty
about EPA’s authority to develop site-specific regulations.
Over the last five years, the EPA has undertaken a wide range of measures designed to address these
criticisms.  At the end of 1996, it appointed ombudsmen in EPA regional offices to resolve problems
causing delays in proposal development (Inside EPA, 1996b).  At the beginning of the next year, it
published a “mid-course correction” in the Federal Register clarifying guidelines regarding superior
environmental performance, regulatory flexibility and the stakeholder process (60 FR 19872).  In
1998, the EPA published a second Federal Register notice soliciting proposals on selected themes,
and further clarifying the concept of regulatory flexibility (60 FR 34161).  It also released two reports
evaluating specific XL experiences (US EPA, 1998a, 1998b).  In 1999, the EPA issued three guidance
documents that grew out of an effort to redesign and streamline the XL approval process as well as a
comprehensive evaluation of 14 projects in implementation (64 FR, 16450, Inside EPA, 1997, US
EPA, 1999b).
Despite these efforts to reform the project approval process, EPA has not been very successful in
moving proposals though the approval process.  As noted above, as of December 1999, only 15 XL
projects had been approved.  In part, this was due to a drastic drop off in the number of proposalsResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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received by the EPA after the first year of the program.  Between 1996 and 1998, only 14 preliminary
proposals were accepted for project development (US EPA, 1999a).
2.  Framework for analysis
 Figure 1 summarizes an informal conceptual framework intended to underpin our empirical analysis
of the determinants of project development costs.  We break down the project development process
described in Section 1.1 into four stages:  initial proposal development, stakeholder negotiations, FPA
development (essentially, interaction with the EPA regional office), and final approval.  Costs may be
generated in each stage.  As the arrows in the diagrams illustrate, the outcomes from each of these
stages can affect costs in the other stages.  For example, a particularly complex proposal may raise the
costs of stakeholder negotiations, FPA development and final approval.  Likewise, a consensus-based













Figure 1.  Determinants of project development costs
Two sets of factors that are ‘exogenous’—that is, unaffected in the short run by any other
determinants of costs—can also have an impact on costs.  One is the characteristics of the firm and of
the facility submitting the proposal.  For example, the location of a facility near an environmentally
sensitive area may raise the costs of stakeholder negotiation and final approval stages.  A second
(omitted from Figure 1 for the sake of simplicity) is the rules and institutions that govern each stageResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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of the process.  For example, unclear guidelines regarding the stakeholder negotiation process may
raise costs both in this stage and in other stages.
It is important to note that each of the factors pictured in Figure 1 are interdependent and therefore
can have a ‘direct’ impact on costs and an ‘indirect’ impact.  For example, firm characteristics can
affect costs incurred in the final approval stage directly and also indirectly through proposal
development.  More specifically, large firms may incur relatively high costs in the stakeholder
negotiation stage because they are highly visible and attract the attention of national environmental
advocates (a direct effect) and may also tend to submit relatively complex proposals that raise costs in
every stage of the project development process (an indirect effect).  As we shall see, the distinction
between direct and indirect effects turns out to be critical in interpreting our results.
Our empirical analysis focuses on a subset of the universe of potential determinants of costs:  the
characteristics of participating firms and facilities (the oval in Figure 1), and the characteristics of
project proposals and the stakeholder negotiation processes (the top two rounded rectangles).  We
forgo a detailed analysis of the impact of rules and institutions because this has been the principal
focus of the literature on Project XL to date and the benefit of further analysis would be limited.  For
similar reasons, we have devoted little attention to the FPA development and approval stages.
3.  Data and sample selection
Our sample includes 11 firms:  eight whose FPAs are being implemented (Intel, Hadco, Berry,
Merck, Weyerhaeuser, OSi-Witco, Lucent and Molex), one whose proposal is in the project
development phase (Imation), one whose proposal has been withdrawn (3M), and one whose project
was facilitated with the help of Project XL (IBM’s proposal requesting permission to use an
alternative wastewater treatment process resulted in a decision by EPA to issue a ‘determination of
equivalent treatment ruling’ that made the XL project redundant).  We used two criteria to select our
sample.  First, we included only firms whose proposals were submitted in the first six months of the
Project because these were the only firms that had completed the process at the time we administered
our survey.  In addition, this criteria allowed us to control for subsequent changes in Project
guidelines and administration (described in Section 1.2).  Second, we only included private-sector
participants because they are the primary target of Project XL and also because one would expect the
nature and sources of costs to be different for public-sector participants.
For each firm in our sample, we administered two confidential surveys in the Fall of 1998:  one to a
representative of each firm and a second to a representative of each EPA regional office involved in
developing the project agreement.  The surveys were sent out by mail and the responses were
collected by telephone interview.  Our secondary sources of data are detailed in the Appendix.
4.  Methodology
To address our first research question (what is magnitude of project development costs?) we present
summary statistics of self-reported cost data for each of our survey respondents.  Costs include the
monetized value of legal fees and person hours spent on the four project development activities
described in the preceding section.  They do not include the costs of capital investments associated
with XL agreements.  Note that in considering the total costs of project development, we areResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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theoretically interested in costs to all stakeholders:  participating firms, EPA regional offices, EPA
headquarters, local regulators and other stakeholders involved in the negotiation process.  However,
collecting data on all of these costs would have been prohibitively expensive.  As a proxy for total
costs to all parties, we collected two types of cost data for each project in our sample:  monetized total
costs to each participating facility reported by the facility and monetized total costs to the relevant
EPA regional office reported by a EPA staffer involved in the project.  We believe that this proxy for
total costs is reasonable because in most cases, the sum of the costs incurred by the firms and EPA
regional offices probably represents the bulk of the total costs to all parties and, in any case, it is
likely to be proportional to the total costs incurred by all parties.  Note that because our proxy does
not include costs to all parties, it almost certainly underestimates total costs.  In addition to monetized
costs, we also report the duration in months of development process for each project.  
To address our second research question (what stages of the project development process and what
issues associated with that process are perceived as being most costly?) we report survey respondent’s
estimates of the percentages of costs attributable to each stage of the project development process as
well as their rankings of a set of issues that the literature identifies as likely to have been important
determinants of costs.
The means by which we address our third research question (why is the project development process
more costly for some facilities?) is somewhat more complicated.  We are unable to use multivariate
regression to determine which characteristics of the project proposal, the facility, the firm, and the
negotiation process are correlated with monetary costs because, with just 11 observations and over 20
explanatory variables, we simply do not have enough data.  Therefore, we employ a simpler second-
best approach.  First, we classify each project as either “high-cost” or “low-cost” depending on
whether total costs—the sum of costs incurred by firms and by EPA regional offices—is above or
below the median for the sample (Table 2).  We use the median rather than the mean to control for
outliers.  Next, for each of the explanatory variables, we calculate means for the high-cost sub-sample
and for the low-cost sub-sample and we use a t-test to determine whether there is a statistically
significant difference between the two (Medenhall and Schaeffer, 1973, 346).  We interpret
significantly different means to indicate that there may be a direct or indirect causal relationship
between the explanatory variable and cost.  Table 1 lists the variables used to differentiate between
high- and low-cost projects.  Precise definitions of each variable as well as data sources are provided
in the Appendix.
In interpreting the results from this simple procedure, it is important to bear in mind that we are not
able to control for correlations between the explanatory variables.  For example, say that we find
correlations between public ownership and costs and between firm size and costs.  Further, say we
know that these two explanatory variables are correlated—large firms tend to be publicly owned.  Our
methodology does not allow us to determine whether there is a causal relationship between public
ownership and costs, or just a correlation between public ownership and firm size.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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Table 1.  Variables used to differentiate between high- and low-cost projects
Variable Comment
Proposal  characteristics
Principal flexibility requested E.g., emissions cap, de-listing of haz. material
Multiple facilities (y/n) Does the agreement cover more than one facility?
Principal media affected by flexibility E.g., air, water, hazardous waste, solid waste
Legal lever Legal mechanism used to grant flexibility
Firm characteristics
Rapid innovator (y/n) A proxy for benefits of permit pre-approval
Number of employees A measure of firm size
Among top 3 firms in mkt. share (y/n) A measure of market leadership
Pollution intensity Sector pollution control expenditures per $ output
Publicly traded (y/n) Is management accountable to shareholders?
Market share largest 8 firms A measure of industry concentration
Facility characteristics
Other vol. federal reg. agrmts. (y/n) E.g., CSI, Design for Environment, etc.
Non-compliance history (y/n) Has facility been fined or cited by EPA?
Number of employees (y/n) A measure of facility size
County personal income (y/n) A proxy for community pressure on polluters
Percent county employment Share of total county labor force employed
EHS staff size A measure of human resources
Miles to nearest town A measure of perceived risk of reg. flexibility
Adjacent residential areas (y/n) A measure of perceived risk of reg. flexibility
Adjacent to env. sens. areas (y/n) A measure of perceived risk of reg. flexibility
Stakeholder  process characteristics
Professional facilitator (y/n) Used to conduct stakeholder meetings
Consensus decision rule (y/n) Was unanimous consent needed for approval?
Number of stakeholders Of all types directly involved in negotiations
Pre-existing com. adv. panel (y/n) Did facility have a panel prior to XL proposal?Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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5.  Results
5.1.  What is the magnitude of project development costs?
Table 2 illustrates that total costs were quite substantial.  For firms, the average cost of project
development was $347,511.  For EPA regional offices, the average cost was $111,163.  The average
total cost was $458,674.  The average duration of the project development process was 26 months.





















Imation no yes median 41
d yes
Intel yes no yes 17 no
Lucent yes yes yes 33 yes
Merck yes yes yes 26 yes
Weyerhaeuser yes yes yes 16 no
3M yes yes yes wthdrn 9/96 n/a
Avg. high-cost $516,187 $170,150 $686,337 27
Low-cost
Berry no no no 12 no
H a d c o n om e d i a nn o 2 7 y e s
I B M n on on o1 8n o
M o l e x n on on o3 7 y e s
Osi-Witco median no no 25 median
Avg. low-cost $145,100 $40,378 $185,478 24
Average All $347,511 $111,163 $458,674 26
Median All $325,000 $107,168 $540,136 26
Notes: 
a firm-specific cost data omitted to preserve confidentiality; 
b as of March 1998; 
c for approved FPA only
d ongoing. Source:  RFF survey, 1998.
5.2.  What stages of the project development process are most costly?
Table 3 presents averages of firms’ estimates of the percentages of costs attributed to each of five
stages of the project development process (these are the same as the stages depicted in Figure 1,
except that the “FPA development” stage has been broken down into two sub-stages).  On average,
roughly a quarter of total costs arose from interacting with EPA regional offices and a quarter from
obtaining final approval from EPA headquarters.  About one fifth of total costs arose from negotiatingResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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with stakeholders.  Less than one fifth arose from interacting with local regulators and from
developing a preliminary proposal.  Thus, our results confirm the conventional wisdom that
interacting with EPA has been the most costly element of the project development process.  Although
stakeholder negotiations have received considerable attention in the literature, our results indicate that
they are a secondary source of costs for most firms.
Table 3. Average percentages of firms’ costs associated









(n = 5) t-statistic
Preliminary proposal 18.6 5.0 35.0 (-4.187)**
Stakeholder negotiations 20.2 16.2 25.0 (-1.291)
Interact w/ local regulators 13.4 17.0 9.0 (2.619)*
Interact w/ EPA region 22.5 24.5 20.0 (0.904)
Final approval 24.4 37.5 8.6 (6.714)**
Other 1.1 0.0 2.4 (-3.537)**
Notes: *Difference between high- and low-cost firms significant at 5 percent level. **Difference between high-
and low-cost firms significant at 1 percent level. Source:  RFF survey 1998.
The average percentage of costs attributed to developing a preliminary proposal was significantly
higher for firms with low-cost projects (for convenience we will refer to such firms as “low cost
firms” and those with high-cost projects as “high-cost firms”).  This suggests that carefully
developing a preliminary proposal may reduce costs in subsequent stages of the project development
process.  In addition, the average percentages of costs attributed to interacting with local regulators
and to obtaining final approval were significantly higher for high-cost firms, suggesting that these two
stages were the bottleneck in the project development process for high-cost firms.
Table 4 presents averages of estimates of the costs attributed by EPA regional offices to each stage of
the project development process.  Interacting with firms accounted for roughly one third of total costs,
interacting with EPA headquarters to obtain final approval accounted for roughly one quarter of total
costs, and the remaining stages—including stakeholder negotiations—accounted for less than one
fifth of total costs each.  Compared with firms, EPA survey respondents attributed a higher fraction of
total costs to interactions between the firms and EPA regional offices, and a lower fraction to
stakeholder negotiations.  This is not surprising since firms, not EPA regional offices, were
responsible for setting up and conducting stakeholder negotiations.
As would be expected, the average percentage of costs attributed by EPA regional offices to
stakeholder negotiations was significantly higher for high-cost firms.  Surprisingly, the average
percentage of costs attributed to interacting with local regulators was significantly lower for high-cost
firms.  Note, however, that this does not necessarily imply that the absolute cost of interacting with
local regulators was lower for high-cost firms.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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Table 4. Average percentages of EPA regions’ costs associated













Preliminary proposal 10.2 4.0 15.3 (-1.899)
Stakeholder negotiations 8.6 14.0 4.2 (3.615)**
Interact w/ local regulators 18.7 11.0 25.2 (-3.616)**
Interact w/ firm 34.2 39.0 30.2 (1.266)
Final approval 26.5 29.0 24.5 (0.540)
Other 1.6 3.0 0.5 (1.832)
Notes: 
a Two EPA regional offices were involved in Hadco process, the EPA regional office involved in Lucent
process did not respond to this question.  **Difference between high- and low-cost firms significant at 1 percent
level. Source:  RFF survey 1998.
5.3.  What issues associated with project development are most costly?
Our survey asked respondents to choose what they perceived to be the first most important and
second most important sources of costs from a list of ten issues frequently mentioned in the literature
(Table 5).  To develop an overall ranking of these issues based on our survey data, we counted the
number of times each was chosen as ‘most important’ or ‘second most important.’
For firm respondents, issue D, “lack of coordination among EPA offices,” is first, having been chosen
as ‘most important’ or ‘second most important’ six times.  Issue A, “requirement of superior
environmental performance unclear,” is second, having been chosen five times.  There is no
correlation between the issues firms chose as most important and their ranking as either high-cost or
low-cost.
For EPA respondents, two issues are tied for first:  issue D, “lack of coordination among EPA
offices,” and issue J, “other program design issues” were each chosen five times.  Two issues are also
tied for second:  issue A, “requirement of superior environmental performance unclear,” and issue C,
“EPA lacks clear statutory authority to implement projects” were each chosen four times.  As with
firms, there is no correlation between the issues EPA regional offices chose as most important and
their ranking as either high-cost or low-cost.
Thus, taken together, our firm and EPA survey results suggest that among the cost-related issues
identified in the literature, lack of coordination among EPA offices and lack of clarity about the
requirement of superior environmental performance were seen as most responsible for driving up
project development costs.  But this finding does not explain why these costs were high for some
firms but not for others:  these two issues were seen as the most important sources of costs by all our
survey respondents regardless of whether their projects were high- or low-cost.  Moreover, our survey
respondents’ perceptions about the remaining issues in the above list were not correlated with costs.
Thus, to explain differences in costs across firms we need to look elsewhere.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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Table 5.  Importance to firms and EPA regions of 10 sources
 of project development costs
No. times selected 1
st or
2
nd most important by…
Source of costs Firms EPA regions
a
A.  “Superior environmental performance” requirement unclear 5 4
B.  Design stakeholder negotiating process flawed 1 0
C.  EPA lacks statutory authority to implement FPAs 2 4
D.  Lack of coordination among EPA offices 6 5
E.  Lack of coordination between state and local regulators 0 1
F.  Lack of coordination between EPA and other regulators 3 2
G.  Lack of coordination with other EPA regulatory reform initiatives 0 0
H.  Industry competitors blocked FPA approval 0 1
I.   National environmental advocates blocked FPA approval 1 2
J.   Other program design issues 4 5
Note: 
a Two EPA regional offices were involved in Hadco process. Source:  RFF survey, 1998.
5.4.  Why is the project development process more costly for some firms?
The next two sub-sections discuss tests for correlations between the explanatory variables listed in
Table 1 and project development costs.  We will argue that of all of the explanatory variables, the
complexity of the project proposal best explains differences in project development costs across
projects.
5.4.1.  Characteristics of the project proposal, firm, facility, and stakeholder process
Table 6 clearly illustrates that certain characteristics of the project proposal are correlated with high
project development costs.  Every one of the proposals in the high-cost category entails either:  (i)
caps on multiple air pollutants and permit pre-approval (Imation, Intel, Merck, Weyerhaeuser, 3M),
and/or (ii) multiple facilities (Lucent, 3M).  None of the low-cost proposals entail a cap on emissions
and only one (Hadco) entails multiple facilities.  In fact, most of the low-cost proposals concern
relatively simple regulatory flexibilities, mostly having to do with waiving specific hazardous waste
treatment requirements.  This correlation between the complexity of the proposal and the cost of
shepherding it through the approval process is not surprising.  Proposals requesting caps on multiple
air pollutants require regulators to confront difficult new issues (such as how to set the caps, whether
to allow cross pollutant trading, how often to require repermitting, and how to monitor compliance)
and proposals covering multiple plants clearly require more evaluation and negotiation than those
covering a single plant.  The legal lever used to grant flexibility to the facility is not significantly
correlated with project development costs.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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Table 6.  Proposal characteristics by cost category







Imation caps 4 C.A.P.s + other A.P.s;
permit preapproval
no air under development
Intel caps 5 C.A.P.s + H.A.P.s;
permit preapproval
no air alternative permits
Lucent permit preapproval yes air, water,
s. & h. wastes
site-specific rule
Merck aggregate cap 5 C.A.P.s;
caps 3 C.A.P.s;
permit preapproval
no air site-specific rule;
permit variance
Weyerhaeuser cap on H.A.P.s & water
effluents; consolidated
reporting; waiver review
no air, water existing waiver
mechanism
3M caps on 5 C.A.P.s + H.A.P.s;
permit preapproval
yes air wanted site-specific
rule
Low-cost
Berry consolidated permitting no air, water,
s. & h. waste
generally applied int.
statements




no water determination of
equivalent treatment
Molex delist wastewater sludge no water, s. waste existing waiver
mechanism
Osi-Witco deferral of new technology
standards for h. waste
no air, water existing waiver
mechanism
Abbreviations:  A.P. = air pollutant; C.A.P. = criteria air pollutant; H.A.P. = hazardous air pollutant; V.O.C. =
volatile organic compound.  Sources: see Appendix.
Four of the six firm characteristics that we consider—rapid innovator, number of employees, top
market share, and market share of the largest eight firms in the industry—are significantly correlated
with project development costs (Table 7).  A rapid innovator is a firm that continuously introduces
new products and therefore constantly changes its production process.  Each of the five rapid
innovators in our sample is in the high-cost category.  The reason is almost certainly that each of
these five firms submitted proposals requesting caps on multiple air pollutants and permit pre-
approval.  They very likely did so because as rapid innovators, they incurred extremely high ‘hold-up
costs’ due to Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) Title V requirements to re-permit every time theirResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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production process changed.  Rapid innovators have complained for some time about the hold-up
costs associated with these requirements (The Reinvention Report, 1999a)








Firm characteristics (n = 11) (n = 6) (n = 5)
Percent rapid innovator 45.5 83.3 0.0 (10.113)**
Average number of employees
a 43,445.4 62,123.2 6,090.0 (4.935)**
Percent in top 3 market share 81.8 100.0 60.0 (3.618)**
Average pollution intensity 1.10 1.04 1.20 (-0.369)
Percent publicly traded 90.9 100.0 80.0 (2.216)
Average market share largest 8 cos. 54.9 61.8 46.6 (4.929)**
Facility characteristics (n = 13) (n = 6) (n = 7)
b
Percent w/ voluntary fed. reg. agrmts. 0.615 0.667 0.571 (0.764)
Percent w/ non-compliance history
c 27.3 33.3 20.0 (0.967)
Average number of employees
d 894.6 1,148.0 683.3 (2.705)*
Percent w/ certified EMS system 15.4 33.3 0.0 (3.848)**
Average county personal income
e 19,326.8 19,258.8 19,394.8 (-0.179)
Percent county employment
f 6.9 4.3 8.8 (-2.797)*
Average EHS staff size
g 10.3 10.6 10.0 (-0.276)
Average miles to nearest town
c 1.7 2.0 1.4 (0.940)
Percent adjacent residential areas 46.2 50.0 42.9 (0.556)
Percent adjacent to env. sens. areas 38.5 66.7 14.3 (4.880)**
Stakeholder process characteristics (n = 11) (n = 6) (n = 5)
Percent w/ professional facilitator 27.3 50.0 0.0 (4.523)**
Perc. w/ consensus decision rule 15.0 33.3 0.0 (3.198)**
Average number of stakeholders 11.2 12.2 10.0 (1.706)
Perc. w/ pre-exsting com. adv. panel
h 30.0 60.0 0.0 (4.899)**
Notes: 
aExcludes IBM as outlier (269,465 employees). 
bIncludes 3 Hadco facilities. 
cData not available for 2 of
3 Hadco facilities. 
dExcludes IBM as outlier (8,000 employees), data not available for Lucent. 
eData not
available for 1 of 3 Hadco facilities. 
fData not available for Lucent. 
gExcludes IBM and 3M as outliers; data not
available for Lucent. 
hData missing for Intel.  *Difference between high- and low-cost firms significant at 5
percent level. **Difference between high- and low-cost firms significant at 1 percent level. Sources: see
Appendix.
Table 7 also illustrates that while XL participants in general tend to be large industry leaders
operating in sectors where the top eight firms control the lion’s share of the market, particularly large
firms, those in the top three in terms of market share, and those that operate in particularly
concentrated markets incurred relatively high project development costs.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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Four of the ten facility characteristics that we consider—number of employees, certified
environmental management system, percentage of county income employed, and proximity to an
environmentally sensitive area—are correlated with project development costs (Table 7).  Facilities
with more employees, those with a certified EMS system in place, and those located in close
proximity to officially designated environmentally sensitive areas incurred higher project
development costs.  Surprisingly, percentage of total county employment contributed by each
facility—intended as a proxy for the local political influence of the facility—is correlated with lower
project development costs.
Three of the four explanatory variables that concern the stakeholder negotiation process are correlated
with transaction costs (Table 7).  Employing a professional facilitator, relying on a consensus-based
decision rules, and using a pre-existing community advisory panel were all positively correlated with
project development costs.  However, in interpreting these results it is important to bear in mind that,
as discussed in Section 5.2, neither firms nor EPA regional offices perceived the stakeholder
negotiation process to be a major component of project development costs.  Thus, there is little basis
for the hypothesis that differences in stakeholder negotiation determine the overall cost of project
development.
5.4.2.  Which explanatory variables really drove costs?
We found that 12 characteristics of the project proposal, firm, facility, and stakeholder process were
correlated with the cost of the project development process.  Given that, as explained in Section 4, our
sample is too small to support the use of statistical techniques that would better indicate which these
12 correlations are really driving costs, we are forced to rely on intuition.  In our opinion, the
following explanation is the most convincing, although it is certainly not the only possible
explanation.
The complexity of the project proposal drove differences in project development costs across firms.
As explained above, every one of the six high-cost firms submitted complex proposals that either
involved caps on air pollutants and permit pre-approval or multiple facilities, while just one of the
low-cost firms submitted such a proposal.  Most of the other 11 correlations we have identified can be
explained as having arisen either because certain types of firms and facilities were more likely to
submit complex proposals, or because such proposals shaped the project development process in
specific ways.  In the lexicon of Section 2, we argue that the complexity of proposals had a ‘direct’
impact on costs, while most of the other explanatory variables that appear to be correlated with costs
only had ‘indirect’ impacts that operated through the complexity of the proposal.
More specifically, rapid innovators were more likely to submit complex proposals involving caps on
air pollutants and permit pre-approval because they incurred extremely high costs as a result of
CAAA Title V requirements to re-permit each time the production process changes.  Rapid innovators
were also more likely to have voluntarily put in place certified EMS systems and community advisory
panels in an effort to reduce chronically high regulatory costs.  Large firms/facilities were more likely
to submit complex proposals since they had both the scale and the environmental management
personnel needed to develop complex proposals.  Firm and facility size was correlated with market
leadership and market concentration.  Finally, since each stakeholder group made decisions as to
whether to hire a facilitator and whether the process would be consensus-based, one would expectResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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complex and contentious proposals to have provoked calls for a consensus-based process and for
hiring a professional facilitator.
Notwithstanding this explanation of our results, we would note that firm and facility size, use of a
consensus-based stakeholder negotiation process, market share, percentage of county employment,
and proximity to an environmentally sensitive area may have had direct positive impacts on costs that
complemented their indirect impacts.  Large firms and facilities may have incurred greater costs
because regulators and other stakeholders were more concerned about granting regulatory flexibility
to firms/facilities with substantial aggregate emissions and high visibility.  Firms that relied on
consensus-based decision making rules may have incurred greater costs during the stakeholder and
approval process as a result.  Facilities that employed a relatively large share of county workers may
have incurred lower project development costs because they had more bargaining power with local
regulators and stakeholders.  Finally, firms located next to environmentally sensitive areas may have
incurred greater costs because regulators and other stakeholders were more concerned about granting
them regulatory flexibility.
6.  Conclusion
By way of conclusion, we first summarize our findings.  We found that on average, project
development costs totaled approximately $350,000 for firms and $110,000 for EPA regional offices.
For firms, roughly half of these costs arose from dealing with EPA while stakeholder negotiations—
the focus of considerable attention in the literature—only accounted for one fifth of total costs.
Furthermore, we found that obtaining final approval from EPA was the key bottleneck for high-cost
firms.  Our respondents were in broad agreement that two issues associated with project development
were responsible for raising costs:  lack of coordination among EPA offices and lack of clarity about
the requirement of superior environmental performance.  Finally, after considering a wide variety of
characteristics of the project proposal, the facility, the firm, and the negotiation process, we
concluded that the complexity of project proposals drove differences in project development costs
across firms.  In particular, costs were high for firms that submitted proposals that either involved
caps on multiple air pollutants or multiple facilities.
An important caveat to our findings is in order.  When Project XL was launched in 1995, the project
development process was by all accounts ill-defined and poorly managed.  Over time, as discussed in
Section 1.2, the EPA has taken a number of steps to mitigate these problems.  As a result, some
project development costs may be lower today than they were for our survey respondents.  This
complication begs the question of whether our findings are still relevant.
To find out, a follow-up survey on transactions costs incurred by current program participants would
be needed.  But in our opinion, such a survey would find that although average project development
costs are somewhat lower today, they are still quite significant and moreover, the principal drivers of
these costs have not changed over time.  In particular, follow-up research would likely find that: (i)
obtaining final approval from the EPA is still responsible for the lion’s share of transactions costs,
and (ii) complex proposals are still the most costly to shepherd through the approval process.  The
reason is that—notwithstanding EPA's attempts to clarify guidelines and to “reengineer” the approval
process (60 FR 19872; 64 FR 16845-52)—the key problems that underlie these findings have not yet
been resolved.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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With regard to final approval problems, the experience of recent project participants clearly illustrates
that the EPA has not eliminated this bottleneck.  Of the 16 projects waiting for final approval in
December 1999, two had been waiting more than four years, three had been waiting more than three
years, and five had been waiting more than a year (US EPA, 1999a).  Lack of a legislative foundation
for Project XL and a lack of buy-in among EPA staff have been widely blamed for raising the costs of
obtaining final EPA approval.  Both problems persist (Inside EPA, 1999; The Reinvention Report,
1999b).
Key problems that have raised project development costs for firms submitting complex proposals also
remain unsolved.  For example, the EPA’s attempt to establish clear guidelines regarding “superior
environmental performance” (60 FR 19872) have fallen short of their goal since they have waffled on
the key issue of how baseline environmental performance should be measured (Cabellero, 1998, 406).
Also, difficult issues that inevitably arise in evaluating proposals for plant-wide caps on air
emissions—how to set the caps, whether to allow cross-pollutant trading, how often to require
repermitting, and how to monitor compliance—remain difficult to address except on a case-by-case
basis.
What do our findings imply about the viability of Project XL and, more broadly, the viability of site-
specific performance-based regulation?  They constitute ‘good news’ in some respects and ‘bad news’
in others.  The good news is that, although we found that the costs of project development have been
significant, our survey results indicate that the one part of the process that many critics have identified
as a potentially most costly and most difficult to manage efficiently—stakeholder negotiations—has
not been a major component of costs.  Rather, a considerable percentage of costs have been due to
problems with EPA’s management of the initiative.
But our results constitute bad news as well.  We found that the complexity of the project proposal
may well have been the key determinant of project development costs.  To the extent that complexity
is correlated with innovation—and judging from our sample there does appear to be a strong
correlation—this implies that innovative proposals are likely to be the most costly.  This does not
bode well for EPA’s prospects of remedying one of the often-cited weakness of Project XL:  its
inability to attract proposals that, if transferred, could have a significant impact on the efficiency of
the regulatory system as a whole.
A second troubling implication of our findings is that, given that participating in Project XL has been
costly and that pushing through the most beneficial type of project agreements has been especially
costly, one would expect the initiative to be biased in favor of large firms.  Such firms have financial
and human resources and economies of scale and scope that lower the costs and increase the benefits
of participation relative to smaller firms.  The fact that virtually all of the firms in our sample are
relatively large (Table 7) confirms this hypothesis.
It is important to note that in certain respects this ‘anti-competitive bias’ may be inevitable if not
beneficial.  According to the EPA, the goal of the program is to transfer regulatory innovations that
are tested in Project XL.  For example, efforts are now underway to make air emissions caps broadly
available (Inside EPA, 1998).  Presumably, small firms will eventually be able to take advantage of
the efforts of larger firms to spur regulatory reform.  Hence, the competitive advantage that large
firms get from participation in Project XL could in theory be temporary and best thought of as aResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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return on their investment in regulatory reform, analogous to the return that inventors get from patents
(Blackman and Boyd, 1999).
The policy prescriptions that flow from these conclusions are straightforward.  In order to achieve
either the ambitious goal of making Project XL a viable ‘regulatory blueprint’ for site-specific
regulation, or the less ambitious objective of ensuring that it serves as an effective test-bed for policy
innovations, EPA must clearly demonstrate that the cost of project development can be reduced.
Despite EPA’s many reforms, there is as yet no extensive record to indicate that the process will be
less costly for future participants.  Unfortunately, judging by the number of proposals that have been
submitted to the program by private-sector facilities in the last several years, the experience of the
first group of participants seems to have biased industry’s perception of the program.  In addition, it
may have seriously damaged support for the program inside the agency.  The challenge for EPA will
be to change the negative perceptions of both sets of stakeholders by ushering a second group of XL
participants through the project development process in short order and at relatively low cost.  Just as
important, EPA  must demonstrate that costs can be reduced for innovative proposals as well as
prosaic ones, that small firms can participate, and that the benefits of regulatory innovations can be
transferred.
Our study also suggests, that given the need to find ways of reducing the costs associated with
developing XL projects, EPA would benefit immensely from developing a reliable mechanisms to
track costs—both those incurred by firms and by the EPA.  As yet, there is little public information
available, and very little analysis of the costs incurred by EPA headquarters, including program
offices outside of the Office of Reinvention.Resources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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Appendix:  Data sources
Table 6.  Characteristics of project proposal
All variables. US Environmental Protection Agency, 1998, Final Project Agreements. Office of
Reinvention. Available at: http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl_home.nsf/all.
Table 7.  Firm, facility, and stakeholder process characteristics
Rapid innovator. (yes/no) US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1998, Form 10-K Annual Report
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 1997,  part I, item 1. Edgar database. Available at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data (search on company name). Firms designated “rapid
innovators” on the basis of information in the sections on industry, products, manufacturing,
competition, and research and development.
Number of Employees. (fiscal year 1997) Hoover’s Online, 1998, Hoover’s Company Capsules.
Available at: http://www.hoovers.com.
Top three market share. (yes/no) US Department of Commerce, 1992, Concentration Ratios in
Manufacturing, MC92-S-2, Subject Series, Bureau of the Census, Economics and Statistics
Administration, Table 3.
Pollution intensity rank. (pollution control expenditures / total shipments *100; both in $ 1994 at four
digit SIC level). Pollution control expenditures are from:  US Department of Commerce, Pollution
Abatement Costs and Expenditures, 1994, MA200(94)-1, Current Industrial Reports, Bureau of the
Census, Economics and Statistics Administration, Table 7. Total shipments are from: US Department
of Commerce, 1995 Annual Survey of Manufacturers. M95(AS)-2, Bureau of the Census, Economics
and Statistics Administration, Table 1. Available at:
http://www.census.gov/prod/2/manmin/asm/m95as2.pdf.
Publicly traded. (yes/no) US Securities and Exchange Commission, 1998, Form 10-K Annual Report
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal year Ended
December 31, 1997,  Edgar database. Available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data.
Market share largest 8 firms. (percent) US Department of Commerce, 1992, Concentration Ratios in
Manufacturing, MC92-S-2, Subject Series, Bureau of the Census. Economics and Statistics
Administration, Table 3.
Other voluntary agreements. (yes/no) Resources for the Future, 1998, Survey data. (hereafter ‘RFF,
1998’); US Environmental Protection Agency, 1998, Final Project Agreements, Office of
Reinvention, Available at: http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl_home.nsf/all.
Non-compliance history. (yes/no)  US Environmental Protection Agency, 1998, Envirofacts
Warehouse available at: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/index_java.html.  This internet site allows users
to electronically retrieve environmental information  at the facility level from EPA databases on
Superfund sites, drinking water, toxic releases, air releases, hazardous waste, Biennial ReportingResources for the Future Blackman and Mazurek
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System data (also hazardous waste) and water discharge permits.  Facilities were designated as having
a “non-compliance history” if any of these data indicated non-compliance.
Number employees. RFF, 1998.
Certified EMS system. (yes/no) RFF, 1998.
County personal income. ($) US Department of Commerce, 1996, County Profiles 1996.  Bureau of
the Census, Available at: http://www.census.gov/statab/USA96.
Percent county employment. (facility employees / county employment) Facility employees from RFF,
1998. County employment from US Department of Commerce, 1996, County Profiles 1996, Bureau
of the Census.  Available at: http://www.census.gov/statab/USA96
EHS Staff Size. RFF, 1998.
Miles to nearest town. RFF, 1998.
Adjacent to residential areas. (yes/no) RFF, 1998.
Adjacent to environmentally sensitive area. (yes/no) RFF, 1998.  Imation’s facility is located in a
CAAA ‘serious’ non-attainment area for ozone, Merck’s facility is located 10 kilometers from
Shenandoah National Park, a Class I Prevention of Serious Deterioration (PSD) area, Weyerhaeuser’s
facility is located in a Class I PSD wetlands area, and Berry’s facility is adjacent to a Class I PSD
river.
All Stakeholder negotiation process variables except pre-existing CAP.  US Environmental Protection
Agency, 1998,  Final Project Agreements, Office of Reinvention. Available at:
http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl_home.nsf/all.
Pre-existing CAP. (yes/no) RFF, 1998.